is by definition not philosophical? 2 To be sure, Bonaventure, like Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Alexander of Hales, and John Duns Scotus, was a member of a faculty of theology. He and his colleagues understood themselves as "theologi"
In addition to the sources discussed above, Dante Aligheri's works offer another nearly contemporary source for understanding how these medieval thinkers conceived of themselves and their works. In the fourth sphere of Paradiso, the sphere of the sun, Dante introduces Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure accompanied by a number of their contemporaries and predecessors-figures, for the most part, with reputations as philosophers as well as theologians. Bonaventure's companions include Hugh of St. Victor, Peter Comestor, and Peter of Spain, the prophet Nathan and John Chrysostom, Anselm of Canterbury and Donatus, Rhabanus Maurus and Joachim of Fiore. 3 There seems here to be no sense of a distinction between "authentic" philosophers and "mere" theologians. While, in all likelihood, Dante was personally acquainted with the University of Paris at the beginning of the fourteenth century, his Paradise appears to assume nothing like the rigid distinction between philosophers and theologians presupposed by intellectual historians like De Libera, Imbach, and Flasch.
If one re-reads medieval intellectual history on the assumption that to practice philosophy is something like "to exercise pure human reason," one is left with the difficult conclusion that these thinkers did not practice philosophy. Etienne Gilson-he was also a distinguished Dante scholar-must be turning over in his grave. It was his life's work to discourage precisely this sort of anachronistic use of modern notions of philosophy as a litmus test for the intellectual seriousness of medieval thinkers. Gilson sought, that is to say, to understand the medievalwaγ of thinking, to describe its proper "spirit." It is interesting to note that the two figures he chose to represent the peculiarly medieval study of philosophy were Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure. Shortly after writing his seminal work on the importance of medieval thought in Descartes's philosophy, his Index scolastico-cartesien, Gilson began research on these two medieval philosophers. Though interrupted in his efforts by the First World War, he went on to produce three clearly related works: Saint Thomas d'Aquin, Le Thomisme, and La philosophie de saint BonaventureP
To come immediately to the point, I might invoke Gilson's conclusion to this last work-a vital and unsurpassed study of Bonaventure's mind-and neatly resolve our initial question and conclude this article. In that conclusion, Gilson characterizes Bonaventure's philosophy as perhaps the greatest synthesis of Christian thought ever realized, and the most peculiarly medieval one. From a "rationalistic" perspective, however, Bonaventure's philosophy would not appear to be "philosophical" at all, since, as Gilson points out, the Franciscan refuses to accept the Aristotelian Organon as the sole criterion of truth in respect of philosophical questions. 6 For Gilson, this refusal constitutes the decisive element differentiating Bonaventure's thought from those of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. It also explains why Bonaventure participates in the great intellectual debates of his time in a manner very different from the two great Dominicans.
One scholar give an authoritative reply to Gilson's attempt to portray Bonaventure's thought as "Franciscan wisdom" and "the metaphysics of Christian mysticism." 7 In his influential history of thirteenth-century philosophy, Fernand van Steenberghen emphasizes the institutional locus of Bonaventure's writings-they are the products of a professor at a university. Although van Steenberghen means to foreground Bonaventure's involvement in the intellectual debates of the thirteenth century, he has a very qualified view of the domain of Bonaventure's philosophy, indeed one that seems overly-restricted and weak. He sees Bonaventure's approach to philosophy as eclectic at its roots; Bonaventure's real contributions, van Steenberghen claims, are theological in nature. 8 I could go on reporting the colorful history of approaches to the thought of Bonaventure. To do so would not be without interest, because the history of speculation about Bonaventure parallels certain trends within the received understanding of medieval philosophy in general. The fact that Bonaventure's thought counts among the most neglected subjects in the current study of medieval philosophy is not as appreciated as it should be. Apart from a flurry of interest in 1974-the heady 700th anniversary of the deaths of both Bonaventure and Aquinas-what study there has been of Bonaventure has been of his role within the Franciscan spiritual tradition and in the history of the mendicant movement. I am sorry to say that, in my opinion, the topos of the "Franciscan vocation" of Bonaventure all too often stands in the place of serious and precise historical research. We know very little, for example, about the sources and traditions influencing Bonaventure around 1235, when he began his academic career as a student in Paris (the year, you will note, before Philip the Chancellor died). It is clear, to go further, that Bonaventure heard the lectures of Alexander of Hales, yet no study exists of the relationship between Alexander and Bonaventure.
Allow me to add here a few remarks about the Quaracchi-edition. The work of the Leonine editors of Thomas Aquinas has clearly become an engine driving an increasingly deep and more sophisticated historical and systematic understanding of Thomas's thought. Ironically, the much more timely completion of the "critical" edition of Bonaventure's opera omnia, completed by the eminent Collegio di S. Bonaventura in Quaracchi, has had an unfortunate side-effect. 9 One can find no reference to the fruits of the great international edition-projects of recent years-the Aήstoteles latinus, Avicenna latinus, Averrois opera, not to mention the works of his near contemporaries Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great, and successors Giles of Rome, Henry of Gent, and John Duns Scotus-in the Quaracchi texts. The historical basis for any study of Bonaventure's relationship to the debates of his day is thus from the outset tightly circumscribed.
I will conclude these rather extensive but, I trust, not uninformative introductory remarks by highlighting three areas that I see as important for future research on Bonaventure:
1. As a body of texts, I consider the academic writings of Bonaventure before his election as the seventh Minister General of the Franciscan Order to be of singular importance for charting the currents at Paris within the first half of the thirteenth century. They reflect the influence of the pivotal Parisian magistή of this period, like Philip the Chancellor, Richard Rufus, and, above all, Alexander of Hales. Such study, of course, would contribute significantly to a more philologically and historically solid estimation of the young Bonaventure. Why not make, for example, the works of Alexander of Hales, as reflected in his most brilliant student, the starting point of generalizations about putatively "Franciscan" positions on intellectual debates? This would certainly be preferable to some fuzzy inferences from a still fuzzier notion of "Franciscan spirituality." 2. Very little is known about the influence of the school of St. Victor in the thirteenth century. This neglect is noted with particular acuity by serious students of Bonaventure because Bonaventure's works subsequent to his election as Minister General manifest the lively influence of Victorine thought in Paris. Those who know something about the enduring institutional vitality of the school of St. Victor will not be surprised by this observation. Bonaventure seems to see the Victorine monastic model as gave this text an interpretation that has stuck with it ever since: the Collationes in Hexaemeron are a kind of manifesto-the manifesto of anti-Aristotelian, anti-philosophical, anti-scholasticism. 13 Now, Ratzinger's interpretation reads like the reflex reaction of a certain kind of Catholicism, and the mislabeling of this text may be the single greatest cause for the overemphasis on Bonaventure's "anti-philosophism." This is a great shame, for in no other work does he give such a systematic and concise presentation of his general approach to philosophy, as one can see immediately in the first Collatio.
Quoting Colossians 2:3, Bonaventure relates the seven-fold treasure of our knowledge and wisdom to Christ. He is the central point in a sevenfold sense: in terms of essence, nature, distance, doctrine, moderation, justice, and concorde.
14 In the very same context, Bonaventure observes that the first science-related to essence-from which all inquiry must begin, is metaphysics. This is because metaphysics proceeds from the consideration of the principles of created and particular substances to the consideration of the universal and uncreated substance; that is, to that Being (ad Mud esse) that has the character of a principle, a center, and a goal (ratiopήncipii, medii etfinis).
λb For this reason, metaphysics cannot be understood as an investigation proceeding from the consideration of a purely formal subject, like the "ens inquantum ens' (the being as such). Rather, it follows the principle of causal exemplarity. From the very beginning, that is, being must be understood in a twofold way. It is both "esse ex se et secundum se et propter se" (being as subsistent, self-modeled, and self-intended) as well as "esse ex alio et secundum aliud et propter aliud" (being as contingent, modeled on another, and tending to another). It is the task of metaphysics to explain the relationship between per se (subsistent) being and contingent being. 16 Consequently, the proper subject of metaphysics 13. Joseph Ratzinger, Die Geschichtsphilosophie des hi. Bonaventura (Mύnchen:
1959). 14. Collationes in Hexaemeron 1,11, V 331a: "Propositum igitur nostrum est ostendere, quod in Christo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae Dei absconditi, et ipse est medium omnium scientiarum. Est autem septiforme medium, scilicet essentiae, naturae, distantiae, doctrinae, modestίae, iustitiae, concordiae. Primum est de consideratione metaphysici, secundum physici, tertium mathematici, quartum logici, quintum ethici, sextum politici seu iuristarum, septimum theologi."
15. Collationes in Hexaemeron 1,11, V 331b: "Metaphysicus autem, licet assurgat ex consideratione principiorum substantiae creatae et particularis ad universalem et increatam et ad illud esse, ut habet rationem principii, medii et finis."
16. Collationes in Hexaemeron 1,12, V 33lab: "Primum ergo medium est essentiae aeternali generatione primarium. Esse enim non est nisi dupliciter: vel esse, quod est ex se et secundum se et propter se, vel esse, quod est ex alio et secundum aliud et propter aliud. Necesse etiam est, ut esse, quod est ex se, sit secundum se et propter se. Esse ex se est in ratione originantis; esse secundum se in ratione exemplantis, et esse propter se in ratione finientis vel terminantis; id est in ratione principii, medii et finis seu termini."
is to think about being as the cause in an exemplary manner of all that exists (esse in ratione omnia exemplantis). The metaphysician thus also considers being as a productive principle (rationepήncipii omnia oήginantis) or ultimate goal {ratione ultimi finis). This is the point of interaction shared by the metaphysician, the physicist, and the moral philosopher. 17 With the phrase "Haec est tota nostra metaphysica' (that is our entire metaphysics), Bonaventure introduces a neat list of topics delineating the proper field of study of the ideal philosopher. The topics included in Bonaventure's metaphysics are: "emanation" (emanatio), "exemplarity" (exemplaήtas), and "consummation" (consummatio), by which he means being "as illuminated by the spiritual radiation and reduced to the highest" (illuminaή per radios spirituales et reduci ad summum).
ι & Bonaventure draws several consequences here, which I will summerize in four points. Each is important for the accurate reconstruction of his thought:
1. He claims that the existence of truth can never be denied because without truth, nothing can be considered or understood ("nee aliquo modo aliqua veήtas sciή potest nisi per Mam υeήtatem") .
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2. To "know something," in the strict sense of the term, is to understand it with certainty. For Bonaventure, this means to understand it by means of, or in relationship to, an immutable truth ("nihil sciatur nisi per veritatem immutabilem") . We might call these basic teachings, to employ a formulation of Romano Guarding the "system-constituting" elements of Bonaventure's thought ("systembildende Elemente') . 23 I will attempt to illustrate the role that they play through an analysis of three central Bonaventurian hermeneutical terms: certitudo, illuminatio, and reductio.
III. CERTITUDO
Bonaventure opens his disputed questions on the mystery of the Trinity, his Quaestiones disputatae de mysteήo Tήnitatis, by pointing out what the conditions are, in addition to the possession of divine grace, for the study of the Trinity. The first two conditions are what Bonaventure calls the "foundation of certain knowledge," and the "foundation of knowledge by faith." 24 In introducing these terms, Bonaventure raises questions about what these foundations are, and how they can be examined. This discussion of the conditions for the study of the Trinity is very typical of Bonaventure's writing; the search for certitude is a Bonaventurian leitmotif. This also says much about Bonaventure's habits as a thinker, and suggests an answer as to his view of the status of philosophy.
The twofold distinction concerning the foundation of knowledge evokes the distinction between philosophical knowledge dealing with a knowledge of the truth that can be scrutinized as "certain knowing" (ut scrutabilis notitia certa) and theological knowledge containing a knowledge of truth that is worthy of belief by "pious knowing" {ut credibilis notitia pia) .
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While it may seem strange to find arguments for the indispensable need for philosophy in an introduction to disputed questions on the mystery of the Trinity, Bonaventure defines philosophy's role very clearly; it follows from his ideas about certainty. Philosophy undertakes no less than to disclose the
Romano Guardini, Systembildende Elemente in der Theologίe Bonaventuras. Die Lehre vom Lumen mentis, von der Gradatio entium und der Influeήtia sensus et motus, Studia et Documenta Franciscana 3, ed. W. Dettloff (Leiden: 1964).
24. De Mysteήo Tήnitatis prol., V 45ab: "Volentes circa mysterium Trinitatis aliquid indagare, divina rjraevia gratia, duo praemittimus tanquam praeambula: quorum primum est fundamentum omnis cognitionis certitudinalis; secundum est fundamentum omnis cognitionis fidelis. Primum est, utrum Deum esse sit verum indubitabile. Secundum est, utrum Deum esse trinum sit verum credibile."
25. See Collationes de septem donis Spiήtus Sancti 4,5 (see n. 73) this is the point of reference for the Bonaventurian doctrine of the "vestigia Tήnitatis' which admit of discovery by philosophical scientia; see also 4,11, V 475b: Όstendit igitur Salomon se pervenisse ad triformem descriptionem scientiae philosophicae, scilicet ad descriptionem scientiae rationalis, moralis et naturalis et ad triformen descriptionem quarύmlibet istarum. Qui haberet descriptionem istarum scientiarum secundum veritatem, maximum speculum haberet ad cognoscendum, quia nihil in aliqua istarum scientiarum, quod non importet vestigium Trinitatis. Illud esset facile ostendere, sed longum esset." foundation of all knowledge. Since theology requires a firm foundation in order to be certain, it follows that theology needs philosophical analysis. 26 Bonaventure's grounds for this view seem to lie in his analysis of the human intellect. To the extent that reason must be understood as a kind of image ("in quantum tenet rationem imaginis"), the knowledge of truth is inherent in the rational soul {"mens rationalis")P You may already see the relevance here of Bonaventure's theory of illumination-we will return to it shortly. What is the foundation for each certain act of knowing to which the natural appetite leads the rational soul? Bonaventure begins with an analogy based on an analysis of a simple semantic structure. That which is most certain "secundum se" is that which is first and most immediately true. In "that which is first and most immediately true," therefore, not only is the cause of the predicate included in the subject, but it is the fullness of being itself which is predicated and which is the subject about which the predication is made. Now, a union of beings that are extremely distant from each other is entirely repugnant to our mind, for no intellect is able to think that one and the same thing exists and does not exist at the same time and in the same respect. Therefore also the division of something that is entirely one and undivided is inconceivable. "Hence to say that a being which possesses the highest degree of existence is non-existent involves a most evident fallacy, just as is the case in saying that to exist and not exist are one and the same. Because it deals with its objects on the basis of natural or acquired knowledge, philosophy is also able to offer a "mirror" to a theology founded on the evidence of faith, which reflects the divine mysteries; see Breviloquium, prol. 27. De Mysterio Tήnitatis, qu. 1 a. 1 c, V 49a: Έst enim certum ipsi comprehendenti, quia cognitio huius veri innata est menti rationali, in quantum tenet rationem imaginis, ratione cuius insertus est sibi naturalis appetitus et notitia et memoria illius, ad cuius imaginem facta est, in quern naturaliter tendit, ut in illo possit beatificari."
28. DeMysteήo Tήnitatis qu. 1 a. 1 c, V 49b: Έst etiam illud verum certissimum secundum se, pro eo quod est verum primum et immediatissimum, in quo non tantum causa praedicati clauditur in subiecto, sed id ipsum est omnino esse, quod evident judgment that the first and highest being must exist {"sicpήmum et summum ens esse est evidentissimum in sua veήtate") . 29 But this first and highest being is God.
This argument becomes easier to follow if one correctly understands the meaning of the word "God" for Bonaventure in this context. Put briefly, he is speaking of Anselm's God, that being "greater than which none can be conceived." Bonaventure concludes that it is absolutely certain that this God exists. This God is the first understood, the "pήmum cognitum" of the human intellect. As such, He is present to every soul and every intellect as the a pήoή condition of all knowing. 30 This insight into the necessity of God's existence is not one that our intellects in some way "develop." Rather, it is the product of a "plena resolutio" or a complete analysis, that is, it arises from the reduction of relative predicates to absolute predicates. 31 In the process, the intellect becomes aware of its own foundation. We do not deny that Bonaventure builds his argument along the via Anselmi. Nor do we overlook the transcendental element of Bonaventure's approach. Being in general is conceived by means of non-contradiction, that is, by the same means by which the intellect comprehends its first concepts, that is, being and one. Bonaventure's use of the indiυisio-model to account for the ratio of the "unum" you will note, bespeaks the strong influence of Philip the Chancellor's masterpiece, his SUMMA DE BONO. 33 Bonaventure distinguishes as the two conditions for every certain knowledge an infallibility on the part of the subject, and an immutability on the part of the object.
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The operative question here is: how can one know with certainty what something is? Bonaventure's answer is by knowing it completely, that is, under the conditions that cover both the object known and the subject knowing.
35 But how can this requirement be met? At the beginning of the fourth question, Bonaventure discusses two positions, both of which he considers inadequate and erroneous. It is not the case that certain knowledge can exist only in the intelligible world of the eternal prototype, 36 nor can one speak merely of the "influence" of the ratio aeterna on human knowing. It serves as a kind of eternal standard, without it being the case, however, that ratio aeterna itself can ever be attained. 37 But created truth (veritas creata) is not merely unchangeable, it is unchangeable as a consequence of a foundational condition. Bonaventure thus seeks a third way between the two rejected positions:
In order to achieve with necessity a knowledge that lays claim to certainty, one seeks an eternal standard for guidance and direction, not [for use] by itself and in its perfect clarity, but together with a created standard, and in such a way that it is to some degree glimpsed by us even in our state of imperfection. 38. Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi qu. 4 c, V 23b: Έt ideo est tertius modus intelligendi, quasi medium tenens inter utramque viam, scilicet quod ad certitudinalem cognitionem necessario requiritur ratio aeterna ut regulans et ratio motiva, non quidem ut sola et in sua omnimoda claritate, sed cum ratione creata, et ut ex parte a nobis contuita secundum statum viae." This eternal standard is the ars aeterna, the eternal creative art, in which things are considered according to their conceptual and specific mode of existence, that is insofar as each constitutes a trace, an image, or a similitude {secundum vestigium, imaginem et similitudinem) .
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From this point of view, Bonaventure must reject the extreme positions cited in the beginning; they lead to skeptical aporia, to the conclusion that "one can know absolutely nothing" {quod nihil omnino contingeret scire). 40 Beyond the a pήoή moment, an a posteήoή or empirical moment is indispensable for the attainment of knowledge. In order to know, that is, the intellect must not only turn itself toward the rationes aeternae, but it must also proceed using essences abstracted from experience. 41 In this context, the ideas are not the obiectum quod of human knowledge-not that what we can perceive-but only the obiectum quo-that through whose influence we attain certainty. The ideas, insofar as they can be grasped at all by the human intellect, can only be grasped reflexively by it. As formal principles of knowing, they first guarantee certainty on the part of both the objects and subjects of knowledge. But the specifying properties and material principles arise out of experience.
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One sees the influence of the Aristotelian theory of knowledge which Bonaventure discusses in considerable detail in the opposita of the fourth question on the knowledge of Christ. In so doing, he arrives at a distinctive solution that thoroughly modifies the received Augustinian conception. 43 39. Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Chήsti qu. 4 c, V 24a: "Creatura enim comparatur ad Deum in ratione vestigii, imaginis et similitudinis. In quantum vestigium, comparatur ad Deum ut ad principium; in quantum imago, comparatur ad Deum ut ad obiectum; sed in quantum similitudo, comparatur ad Deum ut ad donum infusum. Et ideo omnis creatura est vestigium, quae est a Deo; omnis est imago, quae cognoscit Deum; omnis et sola est similitudo, in qua habitat Deus.." Questiones disputatae de scientia Chήsti qu. 4c, V 24a: "In opere vero, quod est a creatura per modum imaginis, cooperatur Deus per modum rationis moventis; et tale est opus certitudinalis cognitionis, quod quidem non est a ratione inferiori sine superiori." 40. Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Chήsti qu. 4 c, V 23a. 
IV. ILLUMINATIO
As we follow Bonaventure's path of thought, it comes as no surprise that light figures prominently in its epistemological and metaphysical contexts. Recall that Bonaventure mentioned "being illumined by the spiritual radiation" as one of the conditions for a true understanding of an exemplaristic metaphysics. 44 47. De reductione artium ad theologiam 1, V 319a: "Όmne datum optimum et omne donum perfectum desursum est, descendens a Patre luminum', Iacobus in Epistolae suae primo capitulo. In hoc verbo tangitur origo omnis illuminationis, et simul cum hoc insinuatur multiplicis luminis ab ilia fontali luce liberalis emanatio. Licet autem omnis illuminatio cognitionis interna sit, possumus tamen rationabiliter distinguere, ut dicamus, quod est lumen exterius, scilicet lumen artis mechanicae; lumen inferius, scilicet lumen cogitionis sensitivae; lumen interius, scilicet lumen cognitionis philosophicae; lumen superius, scilicet lumen gratiae et sacrae Scripturae."
48. Collationes in Hexaemeron 3,24-31, V 347a-348b; see in particular 3,24, V 347a: "Praeter has est visio sextuplex, quae respondet operibus sex dierum; quibus minor mundus fit perfectus, sicut maior mundus sex diebus. Est visio intelligentiae per naturam inditae, et visio intelligentiae per fidem sublevatae, per Scripturam eruditae, per contemplationem suspensae, per prophetiam illustratae, per raptum in Deum absorptae. Ad has sequitur visio septima animae glorificatae, quas omnes habuit Paulus." first vision of the natural light-Bonaventure gives a divisio philosophiae. It is based on the three primary rays of the light of the first and highest truth {tres radii primae veήtatis)-a truth which can neither be denied nor conceptualized as non-existing. 49 This passage recalls the question discussed above concerning that which is understood first by the human intellect. Within his model of the three-fold truth-the truth of the beings {veήtas rerum), moral truth (υeήtas morum), and the truth of language (veήtas vocum)-Bonaventure integrates two rival models for the division of the sciences, the Aristotelian/Boethian divisio and the Platonic/Stoic divisio. Philosophy is, Bonaventure reminds us, the true love of wisdom. It is also the science of all sciences (ars artium). As such, it encompasses both the Aristotelian/Boethian division of philosophy into theology, mathematics, and physics, and the Platonic/Stoic division into physics, logic, and ethics. The science of sciences also encompasses the seven arts. 50 To trace out and expound Bonaventure's hierarchy of the sciences and its epistemological foundations would be a study unto itself. 51 We return to Bonaventure's disputed questions on the knowledge of Christ byway of this claim: the doctrine of illumination allows Bonaventure to develop an epistemology rooted in exemplarism and the theory of ideas. Generally speaking, light figures as a "metaphysical conjecture" about the truth of things as well as a "model" for the relation between unity and plurality, between the absolute and the conditioned, between ancestor and descendant. 52 In order to illustrate this, Bonaventure takes over from the godless person capable of such things? The fact that in doing so "he turns himself to that light by which he is always touched, even when he turned himself away from it." 53 The problem of certainty here emerges once again, since Bonaventure sees, with Augustine, the cause of the pagan's knowledge as lying within rules "that are written down in the book of that light which is called Truth."
54 These rules are obviously in force quite independently of mistakes on the part of the knower. 55 The metaphor of illumination thus stresses the non-empirical origin of certain judgments. Not all human knowledge has its origin in experience or can be taken as the outcome of a process of abstraction. Although Bonaventure stipulates, for the possession of perfect knowledge, the need to trace things back "to an altogether unchangeable and fixed truth as well as to an altogether infallible light" (recursus ad veήtatem omnino immutabilem et stabilem et ad lucem omnino infallibilem) , 56 the influence of the light can nevertheless not be seen as having general application. This divine light is not a cause of, say, wealth, in the same way that, for Bonaventure, this light is a cause of knowledge. At the same time, the light of illumination should not be seen as exclusively exceptional or special, as if all knowledge was infused and no knowledge was acquired or innate. 57 The epistemological problematic in the theory of illumination thus becomes especially pronounced when focused on the individual subject. How are we to conceive concretely of the cooperation of the infallible light of truth? I cannot answer this question satisfactorily at present; however, I can suggest how Bonaventure opens manifold possibilities for a nuanced reply by distinguishing carefully between a created standard {ratio creata) and an eternal standard {ratio aeterna), between the light of the creature (lux creaturae) and the infallible light (lux infallibilis), 55. Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Chήsti qu. 4 c, V 23b: "Quod autem mens nostra in certitudinali cognitione alίquo modo attingat illas regulas et incommutabiles ratίones, requirit necessario nobilitas cognitionis et dignitas cognoscentis." 56. Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Chήsti qu. 4 c, V 23b. 57. Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Chήsti qu. 4 c, V 23ab: "Praeterea, ilia lucis influentia aut est generalis, quantum Deus influit in omnibus creaturis, aut est specialis, sicut Deus influit per gratiam. Si est generalis: ergo Deus non magis debet dici dator sapientiae quam fecundator terrae, nee magis ab eo diceretur esse scientia quam pecunia; si specialis, cuiusmodi est in gratia: ergo secundum hoc omnis cognitio est infusa, et nulla est acquisita vel innata; quae omnia sunt absurda. Et ideo est tertius modus intelligendi, quasi medium tenens inter utramque viam" (see also n. 37).
between a lower reason {ratio inferior) and a higher reason {ratio superior), and between created wisdom {sapientia creata) and uncreated wisdom {sapi-entia increata). To clarify the relationship and the tension within this twofold structure constitutes one of the main challenges for students of Bonaventure's thought. It is a feature of his thought that figures with particular importance in his later works-one which shows perhaps the strongest influence of the Victorine tradition.
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V. REDUCTIO Within Bonaventure's concept of metaphysics, reductiois, in a certain respect, the complement of illuminatio. One way to be moved intellectually is to be moved by what Bonaventure calls "spiritual radiation"; its complement is to be "reduced to the highest."
59 These terms suggest why we might not understand reductio in a purely technical or formalistic sense. Here again, one recognizes Bonaventure's epistemological approach, his analysis of the concepts, and of understanding in the manner of a naturalis resolutio in order to disclose the metaphysical constitution of beings. 60 In the first book of his commentary on the Sentences, Bonaventure distinguishes the intellectus apprehendens, or "receiving intellect," from the intellectus resolvens, the analyzing intellect. The intellect does not proceed by simply accumulating data, adding one item of information to another. Instead, it regards the essence of beings, which is to say, it understands effects together with their underlying causes. Thus, the intellect no longer perceives the single thing, rather, it understands how beings are interconnected and related to their common goal. 61. 1 Sent d 28 dub 1, I 504a: "Sed quod possit intelligi aliquid praeter alterum, hoc potest esse multipliciter: aut quantum ad intellectum apprehendentem, aut quantum ad intellectum resolventem. Si primo modo, sic non potest intelligi sine aliquo, quod est ei ratio intelligendi, sicut Deus praeter deitatem, et homo praeter humanitatem; potest tamen intelligi effectus, non intellecta causa, et inferius, non intellecto superiori, quia potest quis apprehendere hominem, non intellecto aliquo superiorem. Et sic dicit Philosophus, quod, quo unum dicit, quodam modo multa dicit, non simpliciter, sed quodam modo, quia implicite. Alio modo contingit aliquid intelligere praeter alterum, intellectu resolvente; et iste intellectus considerat ea quae sunt rei essentialia, sicut potest intelligi subiectum sine propria passione. Et hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut intellectu resolvente semiplene, potest intelligi aliquid esse, non intellecto primo ente. Intellectu autem resolvente perfecte, non potest intelligi aliquid, primo ente non intellecto." step of such a reflexive analysis of knowledge is an analysis of concepts which explicates what is implicit and undiscovered in what is known. In the third chapter of his Itineraήum mentis inDeum (Mind's journey to God) Bonaventure speaks of the operation of the intellect as that of perceiving concepts, sentences, and conclusions. The intellect understands the signification of the concepts which comprehend the definition of each being. It is characteristic of definitions that the definiens is placed over the definiendum and is given in more general terms; every definition of a special substance (specialis substantia) requires common concepts and, in the end, the first principle of all being, the ens per se, in order to be perfectly understood.
62 Therefore reductio does not lead to the "common" but to the "first" one. It is only in a secondary sense that being-as-such can be understood as a common concept, that is, insofar as being encompasses all that is. Here the doctrine of the transcendentals fits into the analysis of the intellectus plene resolvens, but in a very exemplary manner (and in a way very different, for example, from Thomas Aquinas), referring to the doctrine of Alexander of Hales.
63 If the analysis of the intellect actually proceeds to its very end, then perceiving the transcendentals as the first common concepts, the "conditiones entis," cannot conclude the analysis. Such analysis would only be "semiplene," more or less perfect. For being can be understood as incomplete or as complete, as imperfect or as perfect, as contingent or as perse, and so on. Here Bonaventure foreshadows the doctrine of the so-called "disjunctive transcendentals" which Duns Scotus would later develop. 64 Moreover, as Bonaventure observes quoting Averroes, privations and defects can only be comprehended by reference to affirmative "modes" (positiones). Perfect and complete understanding includes the knowledge of a "eternal being as such" in its very end, 62. Itineraήum mentis inDeum 3,3, V 304a: Όperatio autem virtutis intellectivae est in perceptione intellectus terminorum, propositionum et illationum. Capit autem intellectus terminorum significata, cum comprehendit, quid est unumquodque per definitionem. Sed definitio habet fieri per superiora, et ilia per superiora definiri habent, usquequo veniatur ad suprema et generalissima, quibus ingoratis non possunt intelligi definitive inferiora. Nisi igitur cognoscatur, quid est ens per se, non potest plene sciri definitio alicuius specialis substantiae. i.e., being that "possesses the 'rationes' of all beings in its purity." 65 Through the ideas ("rationes') created and imperfect beings are related to divine being. The idea, as an element of ratio aeterna, must be primarily understood as assimilating things to God. 66 With reference to a full and certain understanding of a single being, in the context of the disputed questions on Christ's knowledge, reductio means to understand this single being not only as such {in se), nor as it is in the soul {in animd), but also and especially insofar it is in the eternal standard {in arte aeterna), also known as the eternal creative art. 67 Therefore, in light of the fact that things are considered according to their conceptual and specific mode of existence, as a kind of trace, image or similitude {secundum vestigium, imaginem et similitudinem) , 68 they belong also to this kind of fundamental epistemological analysis, that is to this reductio. Reductio leads back to the basic problem of the certainty of knowledge, connecting this question with an exemplaristic concept of metaphysics founded in the true understanding of the first and most perfect being as the first understood and the highest principle both of the order of knowledge and of the order of being. Bonaventure's companions in the twelfth canto of the Paradiso. 69 I want to call attention to Anselm, Hugh of St. Victor, and Joachim of Fiore, for these individuals represent three main characteristics of Bonaventure's thought: its search for the necessary foundation of human knowledge, its speculative scope, and its emphasis on salvation history. I have spoken here predominantly of the Anselmian Bonaventure. We may take this as a partial answer as to the place of philosophy in Bonaventure's thought.
My picture is, admittedly, one-sided; it downplays, for example, the poetic character of Bonaventure's writing, what is often called the "mystic" or "spiritual" part of his oeuvre. We should, however, as Dante warns us, be wary of a sharp distinction between the spiritual and the intellectual. In the eleventh canto of the Paradiso, following the custom of both orders to celebrate the Feast Days of the founders of their orders, Dante has the Dominican Aquinas praise Francis, and in the following canto, the Franciscan Bonaventure praise Dominic. In this way, Dante not only passes an interesting judgement with respect to the ecclesiastical rivalries of his time, he also suggests that love and knowledge-"seraphic ardor" and "cherubic light"-are one in God, so that "to praise one, whichever we take, is to speak of both." 70 In Bonaventure, indeed, the search for certainty and for the limits of knowledge stand together, since the summit of human knowing is only attained in spiritual contemplation.
But what does this mean for the question of philosophy and theology? There is no doubt that Bonaventure thought of himself as a theologian, and was, moreover, seen by his contemporaries as a theologus. But, keeping in mind the whole history of philosophy, we should not neglect the fact that the model of philosophy which celebrates the so-called "autonomy of philosophical thought" is itself an historically-contingent model. Can one credibly speak of "pure philosophical thought" in Aristotle, Averroes, or Albert the Great? Do they possess authority as philosophers only insofar as they fit into a particular cultural and scientific background-say that of non-clerical masters in the Parisian Faculty of Arts? As much as we like to believe that philosophy is "independent" today, when you come right down to it, who is really interested in the glass bead games we play? Perhaps modern enlightened philosophers are little more than the magistή ludi of a very difficult game, the game that begins with the question: How can we understand reality and the fact that we are? Might the vaunted "independence" of philosophy today amount to little more than a confession that the leaders of other disciplines-the physicists for example or the economists-are the ones telling the stories that really "work" for contemporary society? Philosophers are left, in their "autonomy" and "inde- Appendix to Bonaventure and the Question of Medieval Philosophy knowledge contains a knowledge of truth that is worthy of belief by "pious knowing" (ut credibilis notitia pia). 76 In addition to these, Bonaventure speaks of "gracious" and "glorious" knowledge. The former is based on a knowledge of truth rooted in a "lovable holy knowing" (ut diligiblis notitia sancta) . 77 The latter is related to a way of knowing the truth which Bonaventure calls "desirable eternal knowing" (ut desiderabilis notitia sempiterna) . 78 Utilizing this four-fold distinction, Bonaventure carefully explains the scope of each kind of knowledge and also of the related sciences. It is remarkable that the role of philosophy is not contested here. Quite the contrary: philosophy obtains again the position of a speculative theology, in the tradition of the Boethian notion of theologia, while theology, by comparison, becomes scriptural theology or exegesis. Bonaventure thus opens anew a debate about the character of theology vis-a-vis philosophy. A point of reference for this debate can be seen in Meister Eckhart's unfinished project of the Opus tήpartitum, a work which integrates metaphysics, speculative theology, and scriptural exegesis within a unifying hermeneutics and follows the twelveth-century model of a deductive or axiomatical theology. 79 
